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ABSTRACT 
In rural economies with missing or incomplete markets, idiosyncratic risk is frequently pooled 
through informal networks. Idiosyncratic shocks, however, are not limited to private goods but 
can also restrict an individual from partaking in or benefiting from a collective activity. In these 
situations, a group must decide whether to provide insurance to the affected member. In this 
paper, we describe results of a laboratory experiment designed to test whether a simple sharing 
institution can sustain risk pooling in a social dilemma with idiosyncratic risk. We test whether 
risk can be pooled without a commitment device and, separately, whether effective risk pooling 
induces greater cooperation in the social dilemma. We find that even in the absence of a 
commitment device or reputational considerations, subjects voluntarily pool risk thereby 
reducing variance in individual earnings. In spite of effective risk pooling, however, cooperation 
in the social dilemma is unaffected.  
 
JEL Classifications: C92, D81, O13, Q20 
 
Keywords: collective action; experimental economics; idiosyncratic risk; income smoothing; 
insurance; lab experiment; public goods; risk pooling; resource sharing; social dilemma; social-
ecological systems; team production
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INTRODUCTION 
Subsistence communities, in low-income and high-income countries alike, rely on the yields of 
natural resources that are susceptible to both covariate shocks (which impact an entire 
community, e.g., droughts or floods) and idiosyncratic shocks (which impact an individual 
within a community, e.g., illness, injury or disabled equipment).  Although incomplete insurance 
and credit markets limit the ability of households to insure against risk, meaningful risk sharing 
(or risk pooling) does arise through informal mechanisms both within and across communities. 
Covariate shocks are difficult to insure locally, but idiosyncratic risk can often be pooled within 
communities. A variety of informal risk sharing mechanisms have been documented in remote 
rural communities around the world, including gift-giving, food sharing, remittances, rotating 
savings and unstructured loans (Fafchamps 2003). These risk pooling arrangements are 
facilitated through a transfer of resources among group members, and can therefore also be 
referred to as resource pooling or resource sharing. In this paper, we describe results from a 
laboratory experiment designed to test the conditions under which idiosyncratic risk is pooled. 
We focus on idiosyncratic risk and voluntary sharing within a social dilemma, which is 
representative of many types of activities in a rural context.  
 
A growing body of literature within development economics explores the theoretical and 
empirical dimensions of risk sharing arrangements that protect against idiosyncratic risk. 
Research has found that a large share of intra-village risk is pooled and standard theory suggests 
that self-enforcing agreements, under which an individual’s gain from defection is less than the 
long-term benefits of cooperation, are critical to the success of these risk sharing networks 
(Posner 1980, Kimball 1988, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, Genicot and Ray 2003, DeWeerdt and 
Dercon 2006, Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). Under full insurance, a commitment device must be 
strong enough (e.g. through heavy punishment or a legal option) to maintain self-enforcing 
agreements, creating a risk pooling network that is immune from individual defection. With only 
limited commitment, however, theory predicts only partial risk sharing and less than full 
insurance (Posner 1980, Kimball 1988, Ligon et al. 2002). Evidence from empirical studies is 
generally consistent with limited commitment models as a high degree of partial consumption 
smoothing is often observed but informal mechanisms, including risk sharing, fail to provide full 
insurance (e.g., Townsend 1994, Udry 1994, Jalan and Ravallion 1999, Ligon et al. 2002, 
Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). 
 
These and other efforts have contributed to the understanding of informal risk sharing and its 
ability to insure against shocks to private assets and income, but shocks are not limited to private 
goods. In remote rural communities with active risk pooling networks, productive activities are 
often done collectively. In hunter-gatherer societies, for instance, participation in collective 
activities and the associated food sharing has been well documented (Kaplan et al. 1985). 
Indeed, there is archeological and ethnographic evidence indicating a long history of public good 
provision in foraging communities (Hawkes 1993). Likewise, in the collective agrarian 
arrangements in West Africa, output is pooled and distributed among members of the collective 
as needed (West 2010). An individual’s ability to participate in, or to receive the benefits from, 
collective action can be affected by idiosyncratic shocks, such as illness or mechanical problems, 
and the group must decide whether to provide insurance through sharing. 
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The specific example that motivates our research design is the collective hunting and gathering 
activities observed in the remote rural mixed economies of the Russian Far East and Alaska. In 
these remote regions, where standard measures of income poverty are extreme, wild foods or 
“subsistence” comprise a significant share of the diet. In the relatively isolated communities 
within these regions individuals belong to distinct networks which harvest greens, berries, fish 
and mammals. Food collectively obtained is then distributed to individuals within the network 
(Wolfe and Magdanz 1993, Magdanz et al. 2002, Argetsinger and West 2009, Gerkey 2010). 
Salmon fishing in Western Alaska and Kamchatka Russia, for instance, is primarily done in 
extended groups (often family) in which individuals contribute labor, gear, and cash to harvest 
and process fish. Individual members contribute not only in the harvesting, processing, and 
distribution of the catch but there is also extensive preparation for the harvest season (e.g. 
repairing nets, boats, and fish camp infrastructure).  
 
It is not uncommon for a network member contributing equipment, cash or labor in preparation 
for the harvest to be unable to participate in harvesting or processing due to illness, injury or 
other unforeseen circumstance. Similarly, because salmon is dried on fish racks and stored in 
elevated platforms, animals sometimes enter camp and destroy a household’s store of harvested 
food. These events are independent of shock to a private activity, such as a wage-paying job. 
Finally, although not the primary focus of this study, the yield from harvesting subsistence 
resources is stochastic, and as a result some groups may be more successful than others. In such 
cases, as in other remote regions, other community members must decide how much of the 
collective catch should be allocated to other community members (Fienup-Riordan 1986).  
 
These idiosyncratic shocks to a collective, or group, activity in these communities are 
independent of a shock to a private activity, and motivated the shock treatments in our 
experimental design. That is, the return on investment to the private activity is certain whereas 
environmental risk is added to existing strategic risk in the group activity. As with private goods, 
the idiosyncratic shock introduces risk to individuals which can be pooled over the group. But, 
unlike private goods, a shock within a social dilemma can affect the aggregate level of resources 
available to the group. Because idiosyncratic shocks can affect a member’s ability to contribute 
to the production of group benefits, it complicates the strategic environment of the collective 
action and potentially undermines cooperation by all members. For example, when other group 
members observe low levels of participation in the group activity, it may be difficult to discern 
whether this is due to free-riding or a negative shock such as illness. Historical evidence suggests 
that shirking via feigned illness may have been common in the early American colonies and 
resulted in widespread food shortages (Bradford 2006). 
 
However, when idiosyncratic risk exists within a social dilemma, voluntary risk sharing can not 
only smooth individual income levels, but can also maintain cooperation by reducing or 
eliminating the riskiness of the group activity. Questions arise about whether groups can 
effectively pool risk to smooth income when the income is derived from group resources, and 
whether sharing can overcome the adverse effects of risk on the collective production of those 
resources. 
 
This paper uses a series of lab experiments to focus on the sharing of idiosyncratic risk in a 
social dilemma setting. While our design uniquely addresses idiosyncratic risk within a social 
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dilemma there are several related studies that are consistent with some features of our design. 
Charness and Genicot (2009) and Selton and Ockenfels (1998) explore risk sharing in a two 
player solidarity game in which one player randomly receives a positive shock in each round and 
each player is allowed to “share” with the other player. Charness and Genicot (2009) find strong 
evidence for risk sharing, or solidarity, in the absence of an explicit commitment device and note 
that increasing the potential for direct reciprocity significantly increases risk pooling.  Barr and 
Genicot (2008) and Attanasio et al. (2012) test the effects of different levels of commitment in a 
game in which individuals can pool outcomes from a risky gamble. Risk in this study, however, 
is not explicitly idiosyncratic or exogenous. They vary levels of commitment and find that 
limiting commitment reduces the frequency with which individuals pool earnings from the 
gamble. Kaplan et al. (2012) use a series of laboratory experiments to test whether resource 
sharing can be explained by risk sharing motivations versus other alternatives. They find strong 
evidence for risk pooling motivations. When subjects individually harvest from a highly variable 
resource they are more likely to form reciprocal sharing relationships compared to harvesting 
from low risk environments. Finally, Erkal et al. (2011) explore the effects of relative earnings 
on giving decisions, where earnings are based on a tournament-style real effort activity. While 
not the focus of their study, they find that players receiving a negative shock also receive large 
and significant transfers from other players.  
 
There is also a large experimental literature that focuses on covariate, or aggregate, risk in a 
social dilemma.  Much of this research focuses on a common pool resource environment and 
generally finds that increased environmental uncertainty leads to lower levels of cooperation (see 
Gangadharan and Nemes 2009, for a review).  Of these, the most closely related to our study is 
Gangadharan and Nemes 2009, who introduce an aggregate shock into a public goods game. 
Treatments varied whether this shock was associated with the private or the public good, and 
whether the probability distribution was known (“risk”) or unknown (“uncertainty”).  They find 
that individuals will avoid investing in a risky private account, preferring the strategic 
uncertainty associated with the group account. However, when the group account faces a 
possible shock, and therefore includes both environmental and strategic uncertainty, cooperation 
drops significantly. 
 
In the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions that motivated the paper, particularly in Alaska, the scale of 
harvest by subsistence users is a small percentage of the total harvest. For example, in the 
Kuskokwim salmon fishery, subsistence accounted for 21% of the total catch between 1980 and 
2004. The bulk of the salmon harvests are from commercial fisheries, approximately 78% during 
this same period (Howe and Martin 2009). With other resources, such as marine mammals, 
harvest quotas are strictly enforced. Moreover, because these communities do not have access to 
commercial markets, and because harvesting entails significant effort and financial costs, the 
incentives to overharvest the resource are quite weak. As a result, the key questions for these 
communities focus on cooperation in jointly harvesting the resource and sharing the fruits of the 
harvest. This is, in effect, a team production problem for which the linear public goods game is a 
reasonable approach (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Croson 2001, Carpenter et al. 2009).  
 
Our team production experiments vary a standard linear public goods game in which we 
introduce the potential for a negative idiosyncratic shock. The shock eliminates the individual’s 
allocations to, and returns from, the group activity. In some treatments, individuals are given an 
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opportunity to share with the fellow group member who incurs the shock. Because individuals 
can avoid the shock by shifting resources from the group activity to the private activity, we 
decompose the welfare loss into two components: the direct loss due to the shock and the indirect 
loss due to changes in cooperative behavior.  
 
Compared to existing experimental research on risk pooling, our study differs along the 
commitment dimension, the nature of the shock, and the strategic environment. Like Charness 
and Genicot (2009), we introduce sharing without commitment, but in contrast to their study, we 
eliminate all opportunities for individual reciprocity. In addition, we add a treatment that tests 
whether perfectly enforced sharing commitments affect decisions about the level of participation 
in the group activity. Several experimental studies of risk-pooling focus on the sharing of gains 
from a lottery (Barr and Genicot 2008, Attanasio et al. 2012), but very few (Erkal et al. 2011, 
Kaplan et al. 2012) allow subjects to pool negative shocks through sharing or some other 
mechanism. Finally, we are unaware of any studies that investigate the pooling of idiosyncratic 
risk in a social dilemma and the resulting effects on cooperation. 
 
Our results suggest that risk not only increases the variability of individual earnings, but also 
induces significant earnings losses due to less cooperative behavior. Contrary to theory, 
however, we find significant levels of risk pooling without commitment and without the 
possibility for direct reciprocity. Surprisingly, while individuals do cooperate in pooling risk, 
high levels of sharing commitments appear to have no effect on cooperation in the social 
dilemma. As a result, there is less variation in income but no improvement in aggregate welfare 
in the treatments with a shock and the opportunity for sharing. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
To investigate the impact of idiosyncratic risk in a social dilemma and the elements of risk 
sharing arrangements that might mitigate any adverse effects, we construct a set of four 
treatments that are summarized in Table 1: a Baseline to provide a clear internal and external 
benchmark, a Shock treatment that introduces idiosyncratic risk and sheds light on the impact of 
risk in a social dilemma, and two sharing treatments that vary levels of sharing commitments. 
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
 
Baseline. The Baseline treatment is a standard linear public goods game in which individual 
earnings are i = (e – xi) + (m/n) i xi, where e  = 20 is the initial resource endowment, xi is the 
amount of resources individual i allocates to the group activity, m  = 2 is the multiplier on the 
aggregate amount of resources allocated to the group activity, and n  = 5 is the number of 
subjects in a group. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the group activity is m/n  = 
0.40. These parameters are identical in all four treatments. After all subjects completed their 
allocation decisions, the results were announced.  Subjects received information about their own 
resource allocation decisions and earnings. Subjects were also informed about the aggregate 
amount of resources allocated to the group activity, but the individual decisions of the other four 
group members were not revealed. While standard theory predicts that nothing will be allocated 
to the group activity, experimental evidence consistently shows positive, though less than 
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socially optimal, allocations that decline over time (Ledyard 1995). We expect to observe this 
well-documented behavior in the Baseline treatment.   
 
Shock Treatment. The Shock treatment parallels the Baseline, but introduces idiosyncratic risk 
by randomly selecting one group member to receive a negative shock after all allocation 
decisions have been made.  The idiosyncratic shock results in the entire loss of the individual’s 
allocation to the group activity, but has no impact on the individual’s allocation to his private 
activity. In addition, the shock prevents the individual from receiving any returns from the group 
activity. Instead, the group returns are equally distributed among the remaining n–1 group 
members who did not receive the shock. This structure is meant to parallel the types of shocks 
described in the introduction, such as the loss of one’s harvest due to spoilage or an animal 
entering camp and destroying food stores. 
 
The identity of the person shocked is not announced. Instead, group members are only informed 
about whether they are affected by the shock. Expected earnings in the shock treatment are i = 
[(n – 1) / n]  [(m / (n – 1))  i (xi – xs) + (e – xi)] + (1/n)  (e – xi), where xs is the group allocation 
of the subject who incurs the shock. The expected MPCR remains unchanged at 0.40. 
 
The potential for a negative shock to eliminate an individual’s return from the group activity 
introduces an additional disincentive to allocate resources to the group activity.  In addition to 
the usual strategic risk that defines the collective action problem, group members also face an 
environmental risk due to the potential idiosyncratic shock. More specifically, in the no-shock 
Baseline treatment, earnings from an individual’s own allocation to the group activity are (m / n) 
xi > 0, whereas the Shock treatment introduces a 1/n chance that these earnings will instead be 
zero. This implies that an individual who is predisposed towards cooperation and allocates the 
entire resource endowment to the group activity (xi = e) risks earning nothing.  Shifting 
resources from the group activity to the private activity avoids both the strategic and the 
environmental risk, and guarantees that earnings will be at least e. Therefore, we expect to find 
that, relative to the no-shock Baseline, the Shock treatment will have fewer resources allocated to 
the group activity, lower individual and group earnings, and greater variance in individual 
earnings. 
 
Sharing Treatments. The remaining two treatments allow the n–1 individuals who are 
unaffected by the shock to share a percent of their returns from the group activity, si 
, with the individual who was shocked. The decision was framed as a percent of the 
returns from the group account, rather than a specific dollar amount, because the actual returns 
from the group account were unknown at the time the sharing decision was made. In both 
treatments, all agents make sharing decisions simultaneously without knowing the sharing 
decisions of other players. Treatments differ in whether a binding sharing commitment is made 
and disclosed to the group prior to the resource allocation decision. In both sharing treatments, 
expected individual earnings are: i = [(n – 1) / n]  [(1 – si)  ((m / (n – 1))  i (xi – xs)) + (e – xi)] 
+ (1/n)  [(e – xi) + ji sj   ((m / (n – 1))  ji xj)]. 
 
In the Without Commitment treatment, all n subjects simultaneously make both an allocation and 
a sharing decision. After all subjects submit both decisions, results are announced. Subjects are 
informed of the aggregate amount of resources allocated to the group activity and the average 
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sharing decision of the other n–1 group members, [1 / (n – 1)]  ji sj , which represents the 
percent of the returns from the group activity that would be shared with individual i if he were 
shocked. 
 
In the With Commitment treatment, each subject first commits to sharing a percentage of returns 
from the group activity, which are unknown at the time of the sharing decision. After all group 
members submit their sharing decisions, the average sharing decision of other n–1 group 
members is announced. Each group member then submits his allocation decision.  Thus, prior to 
the allocation decision, each subject knows exactly what percent of the group returns he will 
receive if shocked. This reduces the idiosyncratic environmental risk associated with the group 
activity and should result in more resources allocated to the group activity relative to the Shock 
treatment.  
 
While each sharing mechanism provides an opportunity for group members to pool idiosyncratic 
risk, standard theory predicts no sharing in the absence of a commitment device. While Charness 
and Genicot (2009) have demonstrated the possibility for risk pooling without commitment, we 
go a step further in that our design removes the possibility for individual reciprocity. In both our 
sharing treatments, it is impossible for subjects to gain information about the individual 
allocation or sharing decisions of other players. We test the null hypothesis of no sharing, but 
considering the substantial literature on cooperative behavior and partial risk pooling, we expect 
to observe at least some risk sharing, which would smooth income. Since sharing is just a 
redistribution of wealth, there is no impact on the group’s aggregate earnings. 
 
Sharing at least some of the returns from the group activity mitigates the adverse impacts of the 
idiosyncratic shock. As a result, if sharing is used as insurance, then these commitments should 
increase allocations to the group activity. This implies that group allocations should be higher in 
the With Commitment treatment relative to the Without Commitment treatment. Also, if we 
observe non-trivial rates of sharing, we expect that relative to the Shock treatment, both sharing 
treatments will have more resources allocated to the group activity, greater individual and group 
earnings, and less variation in individual earnings.  
 
Experiment details. One hundred and twenty undergraduate students were recruited from the 
undergraduate student population at the University of Alaska Anchorage to participate in the 
experiment. All sessions were programmed and conducted using software developed specifically 
for this research project. (The related code can be freely downloaded at: 
http://econlab.uaa.alaska.edu/Software.html). Upon entering the lab, participants signed a 
consent form acknowledging their voluntary participation and agreeing to abide by lab rules. The 
computerized instructions included both graphical and written explanations, and concluded with 
an interactive quiz that required correct responses before proceeding to the decision 
environment. (Experiment instructions can be viewed at 
http://econlab.uaa.alaska.edu/shocksharing/.  The use of diagrams in the instructions was 
motivated by Eckel et al. 2010.).  Figure 1 shows an example of the subject computer screen 
from the Baseline treatment. <INSERT FIGURE 1> 
 
The four treatments were conducted over 12 sessions, with each treatment repeated in three 
sessions. In each session, 10 subjects were randomly divided into two groups of five and subjects 
7 
remained in the same group for all T=15 rounds. There were a total of N=120 unique subjects, 
and G=24 unique groups evenly divided among the four treatments.  We therefore collected a 
total of 360 group-level and 1,800 individual-level observations. At the end of the session, 
subjects were called one at a time to be paid privately in cash. Lab dollars were converted to US$ 
at $1 per experiment token.  Average individual cash earnings were $24.77 (=0.64) plus an 
additional $5 for showing up on time.   
 
To avoid risk pooling over rounds, individual cash earnings were determined by a single 
randomly selected round. This design choice parallels the severity of naturally occurring shocks. 
For individuals living in subsistence-dependent communities, an idiosyncratic shock, such as the 
inability to harvest due to injury or the loss of an entire harvest due to animals or spoilage, can 
mean that one’s survival depends upon the largesse of the community. As in the experiment, 
people in these communities cannot self-insure against the risk. The experimental design, by 
paying one period, mimics this inability to self-insure. 
  
RESULTS 
The experimental findings are organized around two topics.  First, we review the treatment 
effects on allocations to the group activity, income levels and income smoothing. We discuss 
how idiosyncratic risk affects cooperative behavior and how the sharing mechanisms can 
mitigate these impacts.  We then investigate the different sharing mechanisms further to examine 
how sharing commitments influence the underlying individual behavior that leads to the 
treatment effects. The aggregate results section provides a basic overview of the key results 
using summary statistics. The hypotheses are then tested using the panel models presented in the 
conditional results section.  
 
Aggregate Results.  Figure 2 presents the mean individual allocation to the group activity over 
time by treatment. Table 2 complements the figure by providing summary statistics for all rounds 
combined.  In the Baseline treatment, which establishes the benchmark earnings and group 
resource allocation levels without idiosyncratic risk or sharing, mean individual allocations to the 
group activity is 10.4 tokens (52% of the 20-token initial endowment).  Group allocations in the 
first round average 13.1 tokens (65%), decaying to 7.0 tokens (35%) in the final round.  This 
general pattern of moderate levels of cooperation in the early rounds, which then decay over 
time, is typical in a standard public goods experiment. <INSERT FIGURE 2 > <INSERT 
TABLE 2> 
 
When the environmental risk associated with the group activity is introduced in the Shock 
treatment (which does not allow sharing), people tend to redirect resources away from the risky 
group activity and into the safe private activity.  On average, individual allocations to the group 
activity drop by about one-third relative to the no-shock Baseline.  Average allocations to the 
group activity start at 8.8 tokens in round 1 (44%), decaying to 4.3 tokens (21%) in round 15. 
The average over all rounds is 7.0 (35%).  As a result, relative to the no-shock Baseline, the 
mean earnings in the Shock treatment are 20% lower (24.2 vs. 30.4).  
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In Table 2, the average earnings in the Shock treatment of those who were not shocked (27.0) are 
lower than the Baseline (30.4) as a result of the reduced allocations to the group activity. This 
suggests that the presence of risk in the group activity has two effects on earnings: a direct effect 
due to the shock and an indirect effect as a result of changes in allocation behavior. We test this 
by decomposing earnings into these two effects in Table 3. The column labeled “Before Shock, 
Before Sharing” reports individual earnings before the welfare loss from the shock and before 
income is redistributed through sharing.  A comparison of the average earnings in the Shock and 
Baseline treatments reveals that changes in allocation behavior accounted for just over half of the 
earnings decline.  Specifically, of the total difference in average earnings between the two 
treatment (24.2–30.4= –6.2), 55 percent of the earnings loss occurred before the shock (27.0–
30.4= –3.4) as a result of subjects shifting some tokens from the group activity to the private 
activity.  The direct effect of the shock (from 27.0 before the shock to 24.2 after the shock) 
accounts for the other 45 percent of the total earnings loss. Hence, the chilling indirect effect of 
idiosyncratic risk on cooperation is roughly equal to the direct earnings loss resulting from the 
shock. <INSERT TABLE 3> 
 
The mean standard deviation of earnings is presented in Tables 2 and 3 and provides a measure 
of the average variability in an individual’s earnings over time.  The mean standard deviation of 
earnings (s) is calculated as the mean of the individual within-subject standard deviations (i), 
specifically: s = (1/N)i i, where i = [1/(T – 1)]t (it – i)2, and i = (1/T)t it).  By 
definition, the idiosyncratic shock introduces volatility to an individual’s earnings over time. 
Average earnings are higher in those rounds when the individual is not shocked (27.0), than 
when he does incur the shock (12.9). As a result, the mean standard deviation in the Shock 
treatment is higher than the Baseline (7.18 vs. 5.39).  Before accounting for the shock, the mean 
standard deviation in the Shock treatment is actually lower than the Baseline (4.46 vs. 5.39). This 
follows from the reduction in resources allocated to the group activity in the Shock treatment. 
However, the negative direct effect of the shock dominates, leading to an overall increase in 
earnings variability. These results illustrate the additional complexity that arises when 
idiosyncratic risk exists within a social dilemma: not only does the shock have a direct impact on 
earnings, but it also has an indirect impact as individuals reduce their allocations to the group 
activity in order to lower their exposure to this environmental risk. 
 
The two sharing treatments offer the potential to mitigate both the direct effects of the shock and 
the indirect effects of reduced allocations to the group activity. By sharing with other group 
members and mutually insuring against the environmental risk, it is possible to both increase 
earnings and reduce earnings variability (relative to the Shock treatment). In each of the sharing 
treatments, fully insuring all group members against the idiosyncratic risk would require the 
individual sharing decisions to average 20 percent of the group returns (si = 0.20), but the 
standard game-theoretic prediction is that sharing will be non-existent (si =0.00).  We do, 
however, observe considerable sharing in both treatments.  Figure 3 shows that sharing begins 
around full insurance in both treatments (26% Without Commitment and 21% With 
Commitment), but declines over time to roughly 10% in each treatment.   
<INSERT FIGURE 3> 
 
This high level of sharing helps smooth incomes by mitigating the direct effects of the shock. If 
income smoothing were perfect, then individual earnings would be independent of the shock, and 
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as a result, there would be no difference in average earnings between those who were shocked 
and those who were not.  When the allocation and sharing decisions are made simultaneously in 
the Without Commitment treatment, it appears that income smoothing does occur at near-perfect 
levels. Figure 4 presents the difference in average earnings over time between those who were 
not shocked and those who were.  In the Without Commitment treatment, this difference in any 
given round is modest, moreover there are nearly as many rounds (6 of 15) in which the shock 
victims actually earn more than their benevolent counterparts. As a result, over all rounds, Table 
2 shows that average earnings of the two groups are nearly identical in this treatment.  <INSERT 
FIGURE 4> 
 
Interestingly, although we do observe near-perfect income smoothing, it does not appear that this 
has any effect on the allocation of resources to the group activity. In fact, average allocations in 
the Without Commitment treatment (7.2) are about the same as the Shock treatment (7.0). As a 
result, average earnings in the two treatments are similar.  This would suggest that, in the 
absence of prior commitments about how much risk will be covered by the group, the ability to 
share does reduce the riskiness of the group activity and reduce earnings fluctuations, but it has 
no impact on collective action. This outcome is certainly not consistent with prior expectations 
as it suggests that subjects view the sharing and resource allocation decisions independently. 
While these data do not allow us to adequately test related hypotheses, this finding warrants 
future research.  
 
The sequential nature of the With Commitment treatment introduces the ability to pre-commit to 
a sharing decision before making an allocation decision. With mean sharing around 18%, the 
shock has a negligible effect on earnings (24.3 for those who were not shocked vs. 24.1 for those 
who did incur the shock).  In fact, in Figure 4, shock victims actually earn slightly more than the 
other group members in four of the first five rounds. However, despite perfect information about 
the generous sharing commitments, the average allocation to the group activity (6.9) is no 
different than the Shock (7.0) or Without Commitment treatments (7.2).  Therefore, it seems that 
high levels of income smoothing are possible with or without a sharing commitment mechanism, 
but sharing has no impact on cooperation in a social dilemma. 
 
Conditional Results.  The informal conclusions discussed above are confirmed using more 
rigorous conditional analyses presented in Table 4.  We estimate three panel models that use the 
same basic structure: Yit = 0 + 1it + 2t + i + it, where Yit is the individual allocation to 
the group activity (Model 1), sharing (Model 2), or earnings (Model 3) of subject i in round t, it 
is a set of treatment indicator variables that capture the treatment effects, i captures unobserved 
individual subject characteristics and it represents the contemporaneous error term. Because 
subjects participated in multiple rounds of a single treatment, subject-specific heterogeneity is 
modeled as a random effect. We also use a Huber (1967) and White (1980) robust estimate of 
variance. <INSERT TABLE 4> 
 
Consistent with the previous discussion of aggregate results, the allocation decision in Model 1 
reveals that the introduction of idiosyncratic risk in the Shock treatment significantly reduces 
allocations to the group activity relative to the Baseline (p=0.00).  Surprisingly, the With 
Commitment and Without Commitment treatments have similar results. Both coefficients are 
negative and significant, and a Wald chi-square test fails to reject the joint hypothesis that group 
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allocation decisions in the Without Commitment, With Commitment and Shock treatments are 
equal (p=0.97). Results from the sharing model (Model 2) also corroborate the aggregate 
findings.  Individuals do exhibit significant levels of sharing in both sharing treatments. The 
coefficient for the intercept, which indexes the omitted simultaneous decision Without 
Commitment treatment, indicates average sharing of 21% and is positive and significant.  As 
expected, the coefficient on the With Commitment treatment is not significant, indicating that 
there is no difference in the sharing rates between the two treatments.  
 
The earnings model in Table 4 (Model 3) is not conditioned upon whether an individual was 
shocked in a given round, therefore it provides an estimate of an individual’s expected earnings 
and is a measure of the relative welfare impacts among the different treatments. The earnings 
model indicates that, in the presence of an idiosyncratic shock, the expected individual earnings 
are lower than the no-shock Baseline (all three treatment coefficients are negative and 
significant).  More importantly, a joint test of the hypothesis that the three treatment coefficients 
are equal cannot be rejected (p=0.98), which indicates that neither sharing treatment had a 
significant effect on expected earnings relative to the Shock treatment.   
 
Of course, individual earnings in a given round may be affected by the shock and the magnitude 
of this impact depends upon the extent to which the other group members share.  Perfect 
smoothing implies that individual earnings are independent of the idiosyncratic shock 
(Townsend 1994, Mace 1991, Fafchamps and Lund 2003). To test the income smoothing 
hypothesis, Model 4 (Table 5) modifies the individual earnings model in Model 3 by adding 
three new explanatory variables that interact the treatments with an indicator variable (Shocked) 
that equals one if individual i incurred the shock in round t. Model 4 only includes data from the 
three treatments that include the idiosyncratic shock, and therefore does not include the Baseline 
treatment. The intercept can be interpreted as referencing the earnings of an individual who was 
not shocked in the Shock treatment. The income smoothing hypothesis implies that each of the 
three interaction coefficients should equal zero (i.e., for a given treatment, if the interaction term 
is zero, then we cannot reject the hypothesis that individual earnings are independent of the 
shock). <INSERT TABLE 5> 
 
Clearly, without the ability to share in the Shock treatment, the income smoothing hypothesis is 
rejected. Earnings of individuals who are shocked earn 13.70 less than those who were not 
shocked. In contrast, results are consistent with the earnings smoothing hypothesis in both the 
Without Commitment treatment (p=0.87) and the With Commitment treatment (p=0.99).  In our 
environment, this simple sharing institution nearly eliminates the effects of idiosyncratic risk for 
the individual. Thus, the conditional results support the observations made using the aggregate 
results. Without sharing, an idiosyncratic shock has both a direct effect on the earnings of the 
shock victim, and an indirect effect on the earnings of the entire group due to reduced allocation 
of resources to the group activity.  The ability to share without any commitment mechanism does 
smooth individual earnings, but because group allocations are unchanged relative to the Shock 
treatment, the indirect effects of the shock persist and, as a result, average earnings are no greater 
than without sharing. Group allocations, sharing and earnings in the With Commitment treatment 
are statistically indistinguishable from the Without Commitment treatment.   
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CONCLUSION 
We examine whether a sharing institution can facilitate risk pooling in a social dilemma with 
idiosyncratic risk. A standard public goods game is augmented with a negative idiosyncratic 
shock and a simple sharing mechanism in which subjects make private, voluntary transfers to a 
fellow group member who was adversely affected by a shock. As predicted, environmental risk 
via the shock is found to significantly reduce average earnings. This impact on earnings can be 
decomposed into two effects that are roughly equal in magnitude: the reduced earnings that are a 
direct consequence of the shock, and the indirect effect due to behavioral changes to avoid the 
shock.  
 
In contrast to basic theory, however, we find high levels of anonymous sharing in both sharing 
treatments. In both treatments, sharing completely removes the additional variance of individual 
earnings due to the shock, evidence consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis. As such, 
risk pooling emerges without a strong self-enforcing agreement, an assumption needed in related 
theoretical models. This result is similar to that of Charness and Genicot (2009), but is stronger 
in that risk pooling is maintained even when the possibility for direct individual reciprocity is 
eliminated. Although near-perfect income smoothing is observed in the sharing treatments, 
surprisingly, collective action, measured in terms of the allocation of resource to the group 
activity, does not improve with sharing.  
 
This risk-pooling result is also consistent with ethnographic accounts of food sharing in Western 
Alaska and the Russian Far East (Wolfe and Magdanz 1993, Gerkey 2010). While no formal 
tests of consumption smoothing exist for Arctic communities, risk pooling is one explanation for 
the extensive food sharing observed in similar hunter gatherer societies (Kaplan and Hill 1985, 
Kaplan et al. 2012).   
 
In conclusion, consistent with econometric results based on survey data from rural contexts, we 
find that subjects successfully pool risk in an environment with idiosyncratic risk. While sharing 
mechanisms have unique behavioral implications, high levels of risk pooling are observed 
without reputation or a strong commitment device.  
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FIGURE 1 
Example of the Subject Interface for the Baseline Treatment 
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FIGURE 2  
Mean Individual Allocation to the Group Account 
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FIGURE 3 
Mean Individual Percent Shared 
  
 
  
0
10
20
30
M
e
a
n
 I
n
d
iv
id
u
a
l 
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
S
h
a
re
d
0 5 10 15
Round
Without Commitment With Commitment
18 
  
FIGURE 4 
Consumption Smoothing (Average Earnings: Not Shocked minus Shocked) 
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TABLE 1  
Experimental Design 
 
Treatment Features Summary 
Baseline Baseline Standard VCM 
Shock Baseline + Shock  Add idiosyncratic shock 
Without 
Commitment 
Baseline + Shock + 
Sharing 
Simultaneously make allocation and sharing 
decisions.  
With Commitment Baseline + Shock + 
Sharing 
Make sharing decision. Aggregate sharing 
announced. Make allocation decision. 
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TABLE 2 
Mean Individual Decisions and Earnings 
 
 Allocation to  Level of Earnings Mean Standard 
Treatment Group Account Sharing Not Shocked Shocked All Deviation of Earnings 
Baseline  10.4 -- -- -- 30.4 5.39 
Shock  7.0 -- 27.0 12.9 24.2 7.18 
Without Commitment 7.2 16% 24.4 24.2 24.4 6.10 
With Commitment 6.9 18% 24.3 24.1 24.3 5.63 
 
 
 
TABLE 3  
Decomposition of Earnings 
 Average Earnings (all subjects)  Mean Standard Deviation of Earnings  
 
 
Before 
Shock 
Before 
Sharing 
After Shock 
Before 
Sharing 
After Shock 
After 
Sharing 
 
Before 
Shock 
Before 
Sharing 
After Shock 
Before 
Sharing 
After 
Shock 
After 
Sharing 
Baseline  30.4 -- --  5.39 -- -- 
Shock 27.0 24.2 --  4.46 7.18 -- 
Without Commitment 27.2 24.4 24.4  4.37 7.47 6.10 
With Commitment 26.9 24.3 24.3  4.26 6.82 5.63 
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TABLE 4  
Conditional Estimates of Individual-Level Treatment Effects 
 
 Model 1: 
Allocation to 
Group Account 
(xit) 
Model 2: 
Sharing 
(sit) 
 Model 3: 
Earnings 
(it) 
Baseline Treatment (omitted) n/a  (omitted) 
Shock Treatment -3.36 
(0.00) 
n/a  -6.19 
(0.00) 
Without Commitment 
Treatment 
-3.20 
(0.01) 
(omitted)  -5.99 
(0.00) 
With Commitment 
Treatment 
-3.44 
(0.00) 
0.017 
(0.573) 
 -6.07 
(0.00) 
Round -0.34 
(0.00) 
-0.007 
(0.00) 
 -0.27 
(0.00) 
Intercept 13.10 
(0.00) 
0.212 
(0.00) 
 32.49 
(0.00) 
2 73.89 
(0.00) 
29.23 
(0.00) 
 60.57 
(0.00) 
N 1800 900  1800 
p-values in parentheses calculated using robust standard errors. In all three models, “omitted” 
means the data are included, but the treatment dummy variable is omitted. In the sharing model,  
“n/a” means the data from the two treatments without sharing are not applicable and therefore 
not included.  
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TABLE 5 
Conditional Estimates of Individual Earnings 
 
 Model 4: 
Earnings 
(it) 
Shock Treatment Omitted 
Without Commitment Treatment -2.48 
(0.01) 
With Commitment Treatment -2.62 
(0.00) 
Shocked   
   Shock Treatment 
-13.70 
(0.00) 
Shocked   
   Without Commitment Treatment 
-0.27 
(0.87) 
Shocked   
   With Commitment Treatment 
-0.01 
(0.99) 
Round -0.19 
(0.000) 
Intercept 28.42 
(0.000) 
2 370.22 
(0.000) 
N 1350 
 
Model does not include Baseline treatment because it does not include a shock. p-values in 
parentheses calculated using robust standard errors. 
 
 
